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I. INTRODUCTION
With the expanding agricultural use of groundwater resources'
in irrigation has come an increasing prevalence of the phenome-
non known commonly as well interference.2 In today's society an
individual's access to sufficient quantities of high quality water is
imperative not only in the life sustaining biological sense, but in
the continuity of income producing activities as well.
Since groundwater is a finite resource, many factions of society
have found themselves in competition for its use. Primary con-
flicts with respect to groundwater in Nebraska normally arise be-
tween any combination of users for domestic, agricultural,
industrial, or municipal purposes. When such a conflict arises the
competing users look (or should be able to look) to the law, that
"institution through which human conduct is regulated, and under
which collective decisions are carried out,"3 for resolution of their
dispute.
It is in the legal resolution of these groundwater disputes that
lawyers, judges, and legislators alike face the most perplexing and
complicated task of arriving at an equitable and just solution in
each case.
[I]t is the very essence of a law that it should apply to every case.. . . If
there is a different law for every case that arises, then what is being ad-
ministered is simply not law at all but the arbitrary (though not necessar-
ily unjust) decisions of those who govern us. But that is exactly what the
word law means-something which is not such a series of arbitrary events
or decisions, something which will be the same for the next case as it was
for the last. This is where the difficulty arises; for it is the nature of life
itself (certainly of human life) never to repeat itself exactly .... Life
varies, law is of its nature unvarying. Yet at the same time it is the func-
tion of law to serve, to express and indeed partly to make the social life of
1. Groundwater is defined as that water beneath the Earth's surface between
saturated soil and rock which supplies wells and springs. AMEPc.AN HERi-
TAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 582 (1969).
2. For a discussion of the physical and hydrogeological occurrences which ulti-
mately cause well interference, see infra text, at section IL
3. C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION ii (Nat'l
Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 6, 1971) [hereinafter cited as CORKER].
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the community.
4
In view of the foregoing, it should be the objective of all those who
promulgate, disseminate, and interpret the laws to formulate rules
with which well owners can live comfortably in the knowledge that
any well interference dispute will be settled fairly and equitably.
Implicit in this objective is the concept that well owners must be
able to ascertain not only what the law is, but how it will be applied
to them by the courts.
This Comment will attempt to describe the current state of the
law in Nebraska as it relates to rights and liabilities in well inter-
ference disputes. Certain suggestions are also set forth whereby
the current law may become more effective.
H. BASIC GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY
In order to facilitate an understanding of the legal implications
surrounding well interference cases, it is necessary to first formu-
late a basic working knowledge of the science of groundwater hy-
drology.5 Such an understanding provides assistance in
determining the actual physical occurrences that take place be-
neath the Earth's surface and ultimately cause the withdrawal of
water from one well to interfere with the productivity of a neigh-
boring well.
When a well is drilled it extends below the surface of the Earth
into an underground water supply known as an aquifer.6 Upon
tapping the aquifer it "will yield water to wells ... at a sufficient
rate so that the wells ... can serve as practical sources of water
supply."7
An aquifer may be either confined or unconfined. The confined
aquifer houses water between impermeable layers, not open to at-
mospheric pressure. Thus, if the high point of the confined aquifer
is at a point above the well site, pressure within the aquifer will
4. Barfield, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in ESSAYS PRESENTED TO CHARLES
WILLIAMs 121 (1947) (emphasis in original), reprinted in W. Bisam & C.
STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETmcs 803 (1972).
5. The hydrologic cycle
is a simple model of a complex sequence of events. During the
course of this sequence water is evaporated from the ocean, trans-
ported over the land by moving air masses, falls to the land surface
as precipitation, and moves back to the ocean by one or more of sev-
eral routes. [T]his cycle concerns the entire phenomenon of the
movement of water above, across, and beneath the land surface ....
R. HEATH & F. TRANER, INTRODUCTION To GROUND-WATER HYDROLOGY 183
(1968). "Ground-water hydrology refers to the study of the ground-water
phase of the hydrologic cycle ... ." Id. at 185 (emphasis omitted).
6. Basically defined, an aquifer is a water-saturated geologic formation with an
impermeable layer as its base.
7. GROUND WATER AND WELLS 21 (G. Briggs & A. Fiedler 4th ed. 1975).
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force water up, creating an artesian well. Confined aquifers are
sometimes referred to as artesian aquifers.8 The unconfined aqui-
fer has no impervious material above it. The upper limit of the un-
confined aquifer is defined by the water table, said to be "the top of
the saturated portion of the geologic formation."9 In order to ex-
tract water from a well drilled into an unconfined aquifer one must
employ some type of pump.
Obviously, pumping water from a well produces an effect on the
water level in the aquifer. Several terms are applied to describe
this effect at various stages in the pumping process. Static water
level'0 refers to the level at which water stands in a well when no
water is being withdrawn from the aquifer. The dynamic water
level," or pumping level,12 indicates the level at which water
stands while pumping is in progress. Drawdown' 3 indicates the
extent to which the water level is lowered while pumping is in pro-
gress. Residual drawdown'4 is the distance the water level is
found to be below the initial static water level after pumping has
ceased.
As water is withdrawn from the well, the water level in the well
itself and in the nearby formation of the aquifer is lowered below
the static water level. As this occurs a gradient begins to form be-
tween the water level in the immediate vicinity of the well and that
in the more distant formation of the aquifer. As a result of this
gradient, the formation causes it to flow downhill toward the well
under the influence of gravity. As the gradient begins to appear
the water level at the site of the well, being substantially lower
than that in more distant areas of the aquifer, takes the shape of a
hole or depression in the water surface, appearing as an inverted
cone surrounding the well. This depression in the surface of the
groundwater is known as the cone of depression.'5 The distance
from the well to the outer edge of the cone of depression is denom-
inated as the radius of influence.16
The water pumped from a well is extracted from the area imme-
diately surrounding the well. As water continues to be pumped,
more and more water must be derived from storage within the aq-
uifer. Consequently, the cone of depression must expand in order
to produce the necessary quantity of water at the base of the well.
8. Id. at 22-23.
9. Id. at 21.
10. Id. at 81-82.
11. Id. at 82.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. CoRKER, supra note 3, at 46-47.
16. GROUND WATER AND WELLS, supra note 7, at 101-02.
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The radius of influence grows as the cone expands and drawdown
increases as the cone deepens. The rate of horizontal and vertical
expansion of the cone decreases over time, however, due to the
fact that with each foot of horizontal expansion a greater volume of
water becomes available to flow down the gradient and supply the
well.17 During continuous pumping the expansion of the cone will
continue until the rate of recharge to the aquifer equals the vol-
ume of water being withdrawn by the pump.18
Once pumping has ceased the process will be reversed and the
cone of depression will begin to contract, recharging the quantity
of water in the area of the pump. Note, however, that the aquifer
itself must be recharged by natural sources. Thus it may take an
appreciable length of time for the water table to be restored to
near its prepumping level.
Furthermore, if the water-bearing formation of the aquifer is of
high permeability, only a small gradient is required to produce a
relatively large quantity of water at the well head. If the formation
is of low permeability, however, the gradient required to produce a
sufficient quantity of water may exceed the depth at which the
pump intake is placed. If this is the case, the capacity of the well
will be exceeded and the pump will begin to suck air rather than
water.19 "Strangely enough, a well a relatively short distance away
and constructed in an identical manner may penetrate more per-
meable materials. If so, this second well may produce more water
with possibly a smaller drawdown of the water level."20
Well interference takes place when the cones of depression of
two or more wells overlap. As the cones begin to overlap, the gra-
dient to each of the wells is reduced, causing a marked decrease in
the flow of water to each well. In the situation where the pump
head of one well is lower than that of the other, it is not uncommon
for the outside edge of the cone of depression caused by the
deeper well to fall below the pump head of the shallower well, thus
completely eliminating the shallower well's source of water.
The logistical complexity of the well interference dilemma is to
be found in the attempt to determine if, and to what extent, one
well is interfering with another. In order to determine the cause
and extent of well interference, it is necessary to undertake a hy-
drologic survey in which numerous test wells are drilled in an ef-
fort to facilitate measurement of groundwater levels at various
points in the problem area. Through the use of such measure-
ments hydrologists are able to determine whether one well has in-
17. Id. at 103.
18. Id.
19. CORKER, supra note 3, at 47.
20. Id. at 47-48.
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terfered with another. As noted above, the permeability factor
may serve only to further complicate matters in the effort to ascer-
tain the actual cause of the interference.
III APPLICABLE LEGAL DOCTRINES
Well interference conflicts have existed virtually since the time
at which withdrawal of water from beneath the surface of the
Earth became technically and economically feasible. The legal
system, consistent with its societal role as regulator of human con-
duct and collective decisionmaker, 21 has had many of these dis-
putes placed at its feet by parties seeking equitable resolutions of
their grievances. This section will discuss the basic theories under
which the courts in western states 22 have attempted to resolve var-
ious groundwater disputes.
A. The English Rule of Absolute Ownership
The ancient rule of absolute ownership is based on the concept
that a landowner owns not only the surface of the land itself, but
everything from the center of the Earth to the heavens within the
boundaries of his land.23 A second major premise for the rule has
been said to be a policy consideration that courts should not appor-
tion groundwater among owners of overlying land,24 for the ways
of groundwater were once thought to be unknown and
unknowable.25
A strict interpretation of the rule of absolute ownership would
permit the overlying landowner to extract water from beneath his
land for any purpose he deems necessary. The rule does not bind
overlying landowners to any requirement of productivity or rea-
sonableness. If in the process of withdrawing water the overlying
owner's use depletes the supply under adjacent land to his neigh-
bor's detriment, the damaged user has no right of action against
the interfering user notwithstanding his status in terms of time or
use.
21. Id. at iL
22. References in this Comment to western states include: Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington and Wyoming. See generally W. HuTcmiNs, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN
THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTs iN THE WEST 80-109 (1942) [hereinafter cited as
Hutrcnms].
23. The concept is based on "the old maxim that he who owns the surface also
owns 'ad coelum ad inferno'... ." R. BoYER, SURVEY OF THE LAw OF PROP-
ERTY 265 (3d ed. 1981).
24. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 NEB. L. REV.
917, 923-24 (1980).
25. CoRKER, supra note 3, at 103.
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The doctrine of absolute ownership was first applied in the Eng-
lish case of Acton v. Blundell.26 The initial application of the rule
in the United States came in Wheatley v. Baugh27 and was em-
ployed to resolve a dispute between a water user and a miner. The
defendant miner wished only to rid himself of water which was
detrimental to his mining operation while the plaintiff sought to
preserve the water for beneficial use. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the rules governing the use of surface water should
not be applied to the use of groundwater. The court reasoned that
a surface stream could be protected without forcing the miner to
relinquish the total use and enjoyment of his land, but "percola-
tions spread in every direction through the earth."28 The court did
limit the implications of its decision somewhat by stating that the
rule of percolating water would not apply in the situation where
the plaintiff's injury resulted from the defendant's malicious intent
to deprive the plaintiff of water without beneficial use to himself.29
Such logic seems to condone the use of groundwater as a mar-
ketable commodity which could be used on the overlying land by
the owner or sold and transported to other locations for use by
other persons. Even blatant waste is not discouraged by the rule
so long as any injury to the plaintiff is not the result of malice on
the part of the defendant.
In actual application, the rule of absolute ownership in western
states30 has been held to mean that
the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is
there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if,
in the exercise of such rights, he intercepts or drains off the water col-
lected from underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconven-
ience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque
injuria,3 1 which cannot become the ground of an action.3 2
The same language was utilized in paraphrase form in Altus v.
Carr,33 indicating that in 1966 the doctrine of absolute ownership
26. 12 Mees & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).
27. 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
28. Id. at 532.
29. Id. See CoRKER, supra note 3, at 281.
30. See supra note 22.
31. The doctrine of damnun absque injuria is defined as a loss, hurt, or harm
absent injury from a legal perspective, or a loss which does not give rise to a
legal action against the person causing it. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 354
(5th ed. 1979).
32. Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 149, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (1904),
rev'g, 77 S.W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
33. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966). Cf. City of
Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 298, 276 S.W.2d 789 (1955) (hold-
ing that mere transportation of water does not constitute waste). Waste can
be prohibited under the English rule only if it is the result of an unlawful use.
[Vol. 62:270
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remained alive and well in Texas.3 4
Early proponents of the English rule believed that the source of
groundwater was such a scientific mystery that no legal rule could
be formulated to adequately govern the rights to such water.3 5 The
application of the rule is, therefore, quite simple, for "it terminates
at the outset a difficult factual inquiry about what has happened or
is about to happen within the Earth, and the even more difficult
problem of what the court should do about it. The doctrine of 'ab-
solute ownership' answers, 'do nothing.' "36
It has been argued, even recently, that the English rule pro-
vides a necessary degree of flexibility, dependent only upon the
landowner's willingness and ability to invest in withdrawal of
groundwater.3 7 This argument is couched in the concept that with-
drawal of groundwater should not be governed by an "arbitrary
rule that water can be extracted only for certain uses or only for
34. The harshness of the rule may be softening somewhat in Texas, however, as
evidenced by the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Friendswood Dev.
Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978). This case involved
a plaintiff whose land was sinking substantially as a result of removal of sup-
porting groundwater by the defendant. At trial the plaintiff contended that
the defendant's extraction of groundwater had proximately caused the plain-
tiff's land to sink to a point below mean sea level resulting in the destruction
of the land by flooding. Consistent with the English rule as precedent in
Texas the trial court determined that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause
of action and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, stating
that the plaintiff had a cause of action based on either negligence or nuisance.
Smith-Southwest Indus. v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 546 S.W.2d 890, 898 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977). The court held that where a landowner's negligent with-
drawal of groundwater is the proximate cause of injury to the land of another,
the extracting party is liable to the owner of the damaged property. Id. at 897.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the intermediate appel-
late court, but added negligence as a ground for future recovery. 576 S.W.2d
at 30. "[I]f the landowner's manner of withdrawing ground water from his
land is negligent, willfully wasteful, or for the purpose of malicious injury,
and such conduct is a proximate cause of the subsidence of the land of
others, he will be liable for the consequences of his conduct." Id.
This decision is relatively narrow, applying only to cases involving land
subsidence, but it does seem to indicate a mellowing of the traditional Texas
approach. Although the Texas high court did not indicate a willingness to
stray from the application of the English rule in cases involving groundwater
use conflicts, its attitude expressed in Friendswood may well be the first link
in a chain leading to the abrogation of the absolute ownership doctrine in
Texas.
35. See Hutchins, Protection in Means of Diversion of Ground-Water Supplies, 29
CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 n.17 (1940).
36. CORKER, supra note 3, at 103.
37. Note, Establishing Liability for Damages Resulting from the Use of Under-
ground Percolating Water: Smith-Southwest Industries v. Friendswood De-
velopment Company, 15 Hous. L. REV. 454, 465 (1978).
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use in certain areas." 38
Modem legal scholars, however, believe the English rule of ab-
solute ownership to be anarchical in nature "because the alloca-
tion of water is determined by location and the pumping capacity
of wells. Law has no role in the system."39 In keeping with this
philosophy the English rule might more appropriately be renamed
as the "powerful pump doctrine."
B. The American Rule of Reasonable Use
The doctrine of reasonable use, first announced in New Hamp-
shire over one hundred years ago,40 modifies the English rule of
absolute ownership in two significant respects. First, the land-
owner may use only as much water as his needs reasonably dic-
tate, and must not be wasteful.41 Second, the groundwater
withdrawn must be used only on the overlying land and may not
be sold or transported.42 The American rule of reasonable use al-
lows courts substantially more flexibility to arrive at decisions
based on the merits of case-by-case analysis than can be derived
from the preconceived notions embodied in the English rule.
Like the English rule, the American rule is predicated upon the
concept of land ownership. Unlike the absolute ownership doc-
trine, however, the American rule limits the overlying landowner
to a reasonable use of the water.43 Rather than merely addressing
the issue of ownership as under the English rule, the American
rule forces courts to determine the reasonableness of the use.
Under the reasonable use doctrine two neighboring landowners, each of
whom is using the water on his own property overlying the common sup-
ply, can withdraw all of the supply he can put to beneficial use. What is
reasonable is judged solely in relationship to the purpose of such use on
overlying land; it is not judged in relationship to the needs of others. 4
Therefore, while the rule places limitations on the wasting of
groundwater, it is otherwise a rule of absolute ownership.45 The
use of groundwater is limited to such use as is reasonable and is
forbidden on non-overlying land46 under a strict interpretation of
38. Id.
39. Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills to Compre-
hensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L Rav. 179, 194 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Harnsberger].
40. Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
41. Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 205.
42. Aiken, supra note 24, at 925.
43. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 9.
44. Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 205.
45. See Comment, Groundwater Management in Nebraska Without a Legislative
Solution: Is There an Alternative?, 57 NEB. L. REv. 78, 86 (1978) (citing
Meeker v. East Orange, 77 NJ.L 623, 74 A. 379 (1909)).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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the American rule. It is worthy of note, however, that unreasona-
ble or wasteful use and indeed even use on non-overlying land
may go unscathed unless a neighboring well owner is injured in
the process. Without such injury the neighboring user has no
standing to challenge the wasteful or non-overlying use.47
The doctrine of reasonable use makes no provision for alloca-
tion of water in times of shortage. Thus, where the supply of
groundwater is inadequate for all, each user is entitled to all the
water he can withdraw and put to reasonable and beneficial use.
In this context the "powerful pump doctrine" remains in effect
under the rule of reasonable use, and each user must bear his own
increased pumping costs.
The rule applied to well interference cases in Nebraska has
been stated as the pure American rule of reasonable use.48 This
enunciation of a pure application of the doctrine of reasonable use,
however, was in apparent conflict with earlier Nebraska case law49
wherein the American rule had been modified by the doctrine of
correlative rights5 0 for application in situations where shortages of
groundwater existed. The Nebraska Supreme Court later ex-
plained that the announcement of the pure reasonable use rule in
Metropolitan Utilities District v. Merritt Beach Co. 51 was not in-
tended to change the Nebraska rule in view of the fact that propor-
47. Aiken, supra note 24, at 925 (citing Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64
P.2d 694 (1937)).
48. See Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626
(1966), wherein the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the rule in Ne-
braska was:
[W]hile the owner of land is entitled to appropriate subterranean or
other waters accumulating on his land, which thereby become a part
of the realty, he cannot extract and appropriate them in excess of a
reasonable and beneficial use upon the land that he owns, especially
if the reasonable and beneficial use is injurious to others who have
substantial rights to the water.
Id. at 800-01, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
49. In Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933) the court pro-
claimed the Nebraska rule as follows:
The American rule is that the owner of land is entitled to appro-
priate subterranean waters found under his land, but he cannot ex-
tract and appropriate them in excess of a reasonable and beneficial
use upon the land which he owns, especially if such use is injurious
to others who have substantial rights to the waters, and if the natural
underground supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a
reasonable proportion of the whole, and while a lesser number of
states have adopted this rule, it is, in our opinion, supported by bet-
ter reasoning.
Id. at 811, 248 N.W. at 308 (emphasis added).
50. For a discussion of the doctrine of correlative rights, see infra text, at section
Irr.C.
51. 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).
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tional use was not at issue in that case.5 2 Thus the rule stated in
Olson v. City of WahooS3 remains controlling in Nebraska.5 4
C. The California Rule of Correlative Rights
The California rule, or doctrine of correlative rights, was first
announced in Katz v. Walkinshaw5 5 by the California Supreme
Court. The basic purpose of the rule is to apportion groundwater
among competing users during times of shortage or in areas in
which groundwater mining5 6 is taking place.
Three significant differences exist between the doctrine of cor-
relative rights and the rule of reasonable use.5 7 First, under the
rule of correlative rights an overlying landowner is not prohibited
from transporting his water for use on non-overlying land so long
as no harm comes to others using water from the same ground-
water source. 58 Second, those entities entitled to store water un-
derground 9 have exclusive right to the recapture of that water.60
Finally, when groundwater mining takes place the court will allo-
cate to each competing user a share of the safe yield determined to
be appropriate to check the mining.6 1
52. See Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 7, 261 N.W.2d 766, 769-70 (1978). For a
full discussion of this case, see infra text, at section IV.
53. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933).
54. "Our law remained as it was enunciated in Olson v. City of Wahoo." 200 Neb.
at 7, 261 N.W.2d at 770. See supra note 52.
55. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). In Katz, the court enjoined the defendant from
exporting and selling groundwater for use on non-overlying land to the detri-
ment of the plaintiff, who had long been using water from the same aquifer
for irrigation purposes.
56. Groundwater mining occurs when the rate of withdrawal from the aquifer
exceeds the aquifer's rate of recharge, thus depleting the available ground-
water supply. See Aiken & Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water
Rights Law: The Nebraska Experience, 24 S.D.L REv. 607, 608 (1979).
57. Aiken, supra note 24, at 926.
58. Id. at 926 n.29 (citing 2 W. Hurcms, WATER RIGHTs LAws IN NINETEEN WEST-
ERN STATES (completed by H. Ellis & J. DeBaal, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture,
Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 670-75 (1971, 1974 & 1977)).
59. For a general discussion of underground water storage, see Thorson, Storing
Water Underground: What's the Aqui-Fer?, 57 NEB. I- REV. 581 (1978).
60. Aiken, supra note 24, at 926 n.30 (citing Gleason, Water Projects Go Under-
ground, 5 EcOLOGY L.Q. 625, 633-35 (1976), and Gleason, Los Angeles v. San
Fernando: Ground Water Management in the Grand Tradition, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 703, 711-12 (1977)).
61. See Aiken, supra note 24, at 926. Professor Aiken illustrates the safe yield
concept as follows:
[I]f total withdrawals of ground water must be reduced by thirty per-
cent to prevent ground water mining, each ground water user within
the basin could be required by court order to reduce his ground
water withdrawals by thirty percent without regard to priority. See
Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). The mutual
prescription safe yield doctrine established in Pasadena was subse-
[Vol. 62:270
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In its pure form, as implemented in California, the doctrine of
correlative rights
gives each overlying landowner a right to share in the water under his
land, regardless of whether he has previously used it or whether others
are now using it. The law also allows persons who are not overlying land-
owners to appropriate any surplus, which means that cities, districts, and
outsiders can drill and pump the water and pipe it away without any form
of prior approval. The only restraints come after the situation has deterio-
rated to the point that a very long and complicated adjudication is under-
taken and a court imposes restrictions, or until the water users take alarm
and voluntarily form a district as a vehicle for self-imposed controls.6 2
As under the rules of reasonable use, the correlative rights doc-
trine implies that any increased pumping costs brought about by a
groundwater shortage will be borne by the individual users.63 Un-
like the doctrine of reasonable use, however, the rule of correlative
rights does not allow each user to take whatever water he can
pump and put to beneficial use. In times of shortage the available
supply is allocated among competing users, thus eliminating appli-
cation of the "powerful pump doctrine."
As previously noted,64 the doctrine of correlative rights plays a
role in the common law of Nebraska. The doctrine, however, ap-
plies only insofar as it is necessary to modify the rule of reason-
able use in conflicts which involve aquifer insufficiency.
Apparently in disputes arising between competing groundwater
users where the supply of water is sufficient, the common law por-
tion of the court's ruling will be based on the traditional rule of
reasonable use.65
D. The Restatement Position
Section 858 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts66 announces a
rule which attempts to combine features of each of the three com-
mon law doctrines previously discussed with new features of its
quently modified in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975), when the California Supreme Court
held that private ground water users could not obtain prescriptive
ground water rights against public entities. This significantly
changed the basis for safe yield adjudications when public entities
are involved.
Id.
62. Address by Frank Trelease, Twelfth Biennial Conference on Groundwater,
Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 20, 1979), reprinted in Trelease, Legal Solutions to
Groundwater Problem--A General Overview, 11 PAC. L.J. 863, 864 (1980).
63. See Aiken, supra note 24, at 928.
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. But see also infra note 251 and
accompanying text.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
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own.67 From a policy perspective section 858 purports to promote
the development and use of groundwater resources by those indi-
viduals best able to put them to beneficial use,68 a goal not unlike
those embodied in the reasonable use and correlative rights doc-
trines. The Restatement rule is therefore phrased from a stand-
point of non-liability in an effort to promote that goal.69
Basically the Restatement rule declares that, so long as use is
beneficial, a groundwater user is not liable for interference caused
to the use of others. The breadth of this rule is modified by three
exceptions. 7 0
First, such beneficial use must not unreasonably harm neigh-
boring users through lowering of the water table or a reduction in
artesian pressure.71 The rationale underlying this exception to the
broad general rule is based on the fact that the majority of well
interference controversies involve "the complaint not that the de-
fendant has taken all the supply of water, but that a collateral ef-
fect of the withdrawal has been an interference with the plaintiff's
access to the remaining water and his opportunity to capture a
share of it." '72 The view adopted in the Restatement rule "bases the
protection against loss of access to water... on a consideration of
whether, under all the circumstances, the harm done by lowering
the water table or pressure is unreasonable."73 The drafters of the
rule apparently anticipate that the determination in a well interfer-
ence dispute of who must bear the cost of reinstating access to
water for the injured party must hinge on the use to which the in-
terfering party puts the water. The proposed test would place the
financial burden not only on those who would withdraw water to
be transported to non-overlying lands, but on those who withdraw
water in "unprecedented quantities for purposes not common to
67. Section 858 provides:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws water from
the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability
for interference with the use of water by another, unless
(a) the withdrawal of ground water unreasonably causes harm
to a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering the water table
or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of ground water exceeds the proprietor's rea-
sonable share of the annual supply or total store of ground water, or
(c) the withdrawal of ground water has a direct and substantial
effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably causes harm to a
person entitled to the use of its water.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1) (1979).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 comment b (1979).
69. Id.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS § 858(1) (a)-(c) (1979); supra note 67.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1) (a) (1979).
72. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 comment e (1979).
73. Id.
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the locality. .. -74
In determining liability under the Restatement rule one must
look not only to the nature and reasonableness of the use, but to
the amount by which the plaintiff has depleted the supply as well.
Therefore equal treatment and subjection to similar burdens is ad-
vocated for persons similarly situated.7 5
The second exception to the general rule creates liability where
a user's withdrawal of groundwater exceeds his proportionate
share of the supply.7 6 This concept, similar to the doctrine of cor-
relative rights, applies to situations in which the groundwater sup-
ply will not support unlimited withdrawals, e.g., groundwater
mining.
It is generally acknowledged that the existence of an inade-
74. The quotation in its entirety provides that:
In situations in which neighboring landowners use water for do-
mestic or irrigation purposes on overlying land, both of the common
law rules, absolute ownership and reasonable use, cast on each water
user the burden of improving his own facilities or paying the addi-
tional costs when their joint activities lower the water table or reduce
artesian pressure. However, in most cases in which a city or industry
purchases ground water rights or a small tract of land and installs
deep wells and high capacity pumps it increases considerably the de-
mand on the ground water supply and the possibilities of harm to
owners of neighboring land who use the common resource for do-
mestic and agricultural purposes. The reasonable use rule in its orig-
inal form met this problem by imposing liability for interference with
neighboring wells and springs by withdrawing large quantities of
water and piping it to distant places for municipal and industrial use.
As usually stated, the rule gave no protection against identical harm
caused by a large industrial plant or apartment house built on neigh-
boring overlying land. Recently it has been recognized, however,
that the salient factor is not the place of the use but the withdrawal
of water in unprecedented quantities for purposes not common to
the locality, and that it is fair and just to place the cost of improving
neighboring facilities upon the person or organization whose with-
drawals render them inadequate, even though the water is used on
the land from which it is withdrawn.
Id.
75. If a farmer drills an adequate irrigation well and discovers his supply to be
inadequate only after other farmers in the area have drilled wells and begun
irrigation, he has not been unreasonably harmed when he is forced to deepen
his well to the same depth as theirs and to pay similar pumping costs. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 comment f (1979). This example, with-
out expressly stating so, appears to interject into the rule an element of
foreseeability. It would seem equitable under such an interpretation of the
rule to deny recovery to a domestic user who drills a satisfactory well in the
autumn of the year only to find his access cut off the following summer when
the surrounding farmers begin to irrigate. This arguably would constitute
harm that should reasonably have been foreseen by the injured domestic
user, and the irrigators should not be forced to bear the expense of deepening
the domestic well.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1) (b) (1979).
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quate groundwater supply often goes undiscovered until substan-
tial development has occurred.7 7 In such a case an equality of
right may exist in the initial opportunity to enjoy the resource, but,
when the holder of such rights delays its exercise it may not be
extended to permit impairment of existing rights, values, and
investments.
In many cases, controversies have not arisen until after the
groundwater resource has been overdeveloped. Later withdrawals
in such instances have often been made with no knowledge that
they were causing groundwater mining. "In these cases considera-
tions of priority are inappropriate and a reduction of withdrawal to
reasonable shares fixed in proportion to past use, overlying acre-
age or need may be more equitable."7 8
The final exception deals with groundwater withdrawals that
have adverse effects on watercourses or lakes. Such situations are
not within the parameters of this discussion and their treatment is
better left for another writing.
The basic requirement for imposition of liability under the Re-
statement view is a finding of unreasonable use.79 In determining
whether a given use is reasonable or unreasonable the finder of
fact must consider the purpose of the use,80 the economic value of
the use,8 ' the social value of the use,82 the extent and amount of
harm caused,83 the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting
the use by one proprietor or the other,84 the practicality of adjust-
ing the quantity of water used by each proprietor,85 the protection
of existing values of water uses, land, investments, and enter-
prises,8 6 and the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear
the loss. 87 In the event that the use causing the harm is deemed to
be unreasonable and liability is imposed, the remedy granted may
be either damages or injunctive relief.88
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 comment g (1979).
78. Id.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(2) (1979), which states that a de-
termination of liability under § 858(1) is to be governed by the principles
stated in §§ 850-57. The primary duty of the finder of fact is the determination
of reasonableness of use. Factors to be considered in arriving at such a deter-
mination are set out in § 850A. See infra text accompanying notes 80-87.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(a) (1979).
81. Id. at § 850A(c).
82. Id. at § 850A(d).
83. Id. at § 850A(e).
84. Id. at § 850A(f).
85. Id. at § 850A(g).
86. Id. at § 850A(h).
87. Id. at § 850A(i).
88. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A comment m (1979).
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Prior to the adoption of section 858 in 1979, the proposed draft89
was recommended by legal scholarsO as a replacement for the ex-
isting rule of law governing well interference controversies in Ne-
braska.91 It was reasoned in the recommendation that, although
small well owners enjoyed statutory protection against large scale
diversions to non-overlying lands,92 there was no protection
against unreasonable use by large irrigation facilities or industries
utilizing the water on overlying lands.9 3 The Restatement posi-
tion,94 Professor Harnsberger and his colleagues believed, would
provide an equitable remedy for a problem without a suitable solu-
tion at common law.
The trial court in Prather v. Eisenmann9 5 applied the proposed
Restatement rule9 6 as a basis for granting both injunctive relief
and money damages to plaintiffs whose domestic wells were inter-
fered with as a result of groundwater withdrawals made by the de-
fendant for the purpose of irrigating his overlying land. The
Nebraska Supreme Court, however, rejected the Restatement pro-
posal,9 7 opting instead to affirm the district court's result through
an application of what appears to be the Restatement rule (albeit
couched in terms of existing common law doctrines) 98 read in light
of the groundwater preference statute99 in effect in Nebraska.100
The holding in Prather seems to indicate that the Restatement po-
sition has not been adopted as the Nebraska rule, despite recom-
mendations to the contrary by legal scholars.1O'
E. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
The concept of prior appropriation has grown out of the notion
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
90. Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 209-10.
91. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
92. Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 209-10 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-647 (1968),
amended by NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-647 (Supp. 1982)).
93. Id. at 210.
94. At the time these recommendations were made § 858 of the Restatement, as
previously noted, was in proposed draft form. See supra note 89.
95. No. 17094 (Madison County Dist. Ct., decided Aug. 1976). For a more detailed
discussion of the case, see infra text, at section IV.
96. "It is apparent the trial court used [the Nebraska preference statute] with an
adaptation of the rule proposed in the Tentative Draft No. 17 of section 858A
of Restatement, Torts 2d (1971)." Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 8, 261
N.W.2d 766, 770 (1978).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
98. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1974). For a further discussion of the Nebraska
preference statute, see infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
100. 200 Neb. at 8-10, 261 N.W.2d at 770-71.
101. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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that he who is first in time is also first in right. The doctrine
originated with regard to all natural resources during the days of
the gold rush in California,102 when all that was required for the
protection of one's right to mine gold was the staking and record-
ing of the claim. With a replenishable resource such as water,
where multiple withdrawals can be taken from a common source, a
user's priority is established in accordance with the time of his
first use.103 A person whose priority in time places his rights above
those of another is referred to as the senior appropriator. The
party whose rights are subordinate to those of the senior appropri-
ator is aptly known as the junior appropriator.
Under a pure system of prior appropriation, ownership of the
overlying land is essentially irrelevant to the acquisition of rights
to the use of water. All that is required to obtain a right is that
water be taken and applied to a beneficial use.104 What constitutes
a beneficial use is defined statutorily in some jurisdictions,105
while in others specific uses have required litigation in order to
determine whether they were beneficial. 0 6
Most western states governed by prior appropriation operate on
a well permit system whereby the date of the permit acts to place
the appropriator in the line of priority. The priority system is then
utilized to resolve disputes between competing users in the same
category.107 Conflicts between users in different categories are
normally resolved on the basis of preferences. 0 8
Nebraska has no priority system pertaining to groundwater. It
does, however, employ a constitutional provision for prior appro-
102. Oeltjen & Fischer, Allocation of Rights to Water: Preferences, Priorities and
the Role of the Market, 57 NEB. L. REV. 245, 253 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Qeltjen].
103. The first party to draw water from the common source establishes first prior-
ity, the second party to draw has second priority, and so forth. See generaly
Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
104. Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, Rights to Nebraska Streamflows: An Histori-
cal Overtiew with Recommendations, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 317 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Fischer].
105. In Arizona, for example, the legislature has stated that domestic, personal,
municipal, water power, wildlife management, livestock watering, recreation,
mining, and water for delivery to consumers constitute beneficial uses for
which water may be appropriated. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (Supp.
1980). Cf. TEX. WATER CODE AN. § 5.023 (Vernon 1972) (setting out similar
legislative reasonableness standards).
106. Examples of uses which have been judicially declared as beneficial include
the operation of fish hatcheries, Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247
(1933), and the provision of necessities for a railroad, Drake v. Earhart, 2
Idaho 715, 23 P. 541 (1890).
107. For example, such cases would involve irrigator versus irrigator, or domestic
user versus domestic user.
108. For a discussion of the preference system, see infra text, at section I.LF.
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priation in governing the use of surface water.109
Under the Nebraska surface water priority system a user must
obtain a permit to appropriate such water to his own use.1 10 The
permit operates, as in other states, to place the user chronologi-
cally within the priority system by requiring that his beneficial use
of the water begin at a designated time."' "Failure to maintain
beneficial use or to avoid waste are conditions which usually sus-
pend effectiveness of the priority, or extinguish it completely."" 2
Perhaps the reason that the Nebraska Unicameral has not initi-
ated a system of prior appropriation relating to groundwater is to
be found in the fact that many unanswered questions remain with
respect to subterranean water and prior appropriation. Unlike sur-
face water, it is difficult and expensive to determine when the
groundwater supply is inadequate or when groundwater mining is
taking place. Even when complete and accurate hydrologic data
indicate that mining is occurring, is it equitable to deny access to
appropriators in anticipation of significant recharge? Such
recharge may conceivably require a substantial period of time,
and, if the water in the aquifer is to be utilized at all, mining must
be allowed to continue. A decision not to utilize the groundwater
source at all would be rare, yet how is the prior use to be
protected?
If two appropriators are in competition for water that is physi-
cally available to both at an added cost, at what point should the
junior user be required to stop his withdrawals? Is the senior ap-
propriator protected in his right of access, or only to the availabil-
ity of water in the aquifer without regard to the increased cost of
retrieval?"3 These and other questions cause extreme difficulty in
the equitable resolution of well interference disputes under a strict
system of prior appropriation. The choice of the legislature in Ne-
109. The right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for
beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is de-
manded by the public interest. Priority of appropriation shall give
the better right as between those using the water for the same pur-
pose, but when the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for
the use of all those desiring to use the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have preference over those claiming it
for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural pur-
poses shall have the preference over those using the same for manu-
facturing purposes. Provided no inferior right to use the waters of
the state shall be acquired by a superior right without just compen-
sation therefor to the inferior user.
NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6. For the codification of the provision see NEB. REv.
STAT. § 46-204 (Supp. 1982).
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-233 (1978).
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-238 (Supp. 1982).
112. Comment, supra note 45, at 84 (footnote omitted).
113. See CORKER, supra note 3, at 110-11.
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braska not to initiate a system of prior appropriation applicable to
groundwater is perhaps a sign favorable to the wise development
of Nebraska groundwater law.
F. Preferences
A preference created for a particular use of groundwater may
vary in its effect depending on its type. Basically, two separate cat-
egories of preferences exist. The absolute or true preference ex-
ists when 'the preferred use may be initiated without regard to the
fact that the supply is already fully appropriated for other pur-
poses, and the preferred user may take water without paying com-
pensation to persons whose uses are thereby impaired."" 4 The
compensatory, or power to condemn, preference gives the pre-
ferred user the right to exercise the preference only where com-
pensation is paid to the prior appropriator for his loss of water."5
As the definition of a compensatory preference suggests, prefer-
ences are commonly used to augment a system of prior appopria-
tion." 6 Surface water use in Nebraska is governed by a
constitutional mandate which embodies both prior appropriation
and compensatory preferences." 7 Nebraska groundwater law, n8
however, provides statutorily for preferences only, with no men-
tion of prior appropriation.
As a general proposition, preferences to the use of groundwater
act as illustrations of a legislative determination of the relative so-
cial utility of various water uses. A preference system normally
operates to allow a preferred user to condemn1 9 the use of a lower
114. Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MT. L. REV. 133, 134 (1955).
115. Id. at 137.
116. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
117. See supra note 109.
118.
Preference in the use of underground water shall be given to
those using the water for domestic purposes. They shall have prefer-
ence over those claiming it for any other purpose. Those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those us-
ing the same for manufacturing or industrial purposes.
As used in this section, domestic use of ground water shall mean
all uses of ground water required for human needs as it relates to
health, fire control and sanitation and shall include the use of ground
water for domestic livestock as related to normal farm and ranch
operations.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978). The statute provides for preferences in the
use of groundwater without provision for prior appropriation. Note, however,
that § 46-613 spells out a definition of domestic use. This definition is not in-
cluded in the constitutional provision dealing with surface water preferences.
See supra note 109.
119. A power to condemn preference requires the preferred user to pay just com-
pensation to the condemned user when the preference is exercised.
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preferred user or non-preferred user during a time of insufficient
water supply. In effect the exercise of a preference serves to trans-
fer ownership of the water right from the condemned user to the
preferred user.120 In view of the reference to condemnation, the
exercise of a preference as described here would apply in Ne-
braska only to surface water rights.121
Groundwater preferences may arguably be exercised in either
a water sufficient or a water insufficient aquifer;122 and, since the
Nebraska groundwater preference statute' 23 apparently creates a
system of absolute preferences, 24 the exercise may take place
without payment of compensation. The exercise of a preference in
a water insufficient aquifer may be plagued with many problems,
not the least important of which would be the arrival at a conclu-
sive determination that the aquifer is in fact water insufficient. 25
Neither is the exercise of a preference in a water sufficient aquifer
in Nebraska without its problems. Rather than acting as a transfer
of water rights from one user to another,126 such an exercise appar-
ently serves to protect the preferred user's means of diversion of
groundwater.12 7
IV. PRATHER v. EISENMANN
Prather v. Eisenmann 28 represents the first and only case in
which the Nebraska Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
construe the Nebraska groundwater preference statute 29 in the
context of a well interference dispute between a domestic user and
an irrigator.
A. The Facts
The complainants in Prather were three landowning families,
120. See Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 232.
121. Payment of just compensation for the exercise of a preference is mentioned
only in the constitutional provision relating to surface water. See supra note
109. No such provision is made with reference to groundwater. See supra
note 118.
122. See Note, Water Law: Prather v. Eisenmann, 59 NEB. L REV. 831, 851 (1980).
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978).
124. See supra note 121.
125. For a discussion of the many existing problems relating to prior appropria-
tion of groundwater which may also present difficulties with regard to the
exercise of a preference in a water insufficient aquifer, see, e.g., CORKER,
supra note 3, at 110-11.
126. See supra text accompanying note 120.
127. See generally Prather v. Eisemann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978), and the
discussion of the case in section IV of this Comment.
128. 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978).
129. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978).
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the Furleys, the Prathers, and the Zessins, each of whose residen-
tial property was served by a domestic well drilled into a common
artesian aquifer.130 The Prathers, who, for purposes of litigation,
were assigned the claims of the remaining two domestic well own-
ers,131 resided on a nine-acre property near the city of Madison,
Nebraska. On this property the Prathers maintained an artesian
well, approximately 122 feet deep with a two-inch casing, that con-
tained pressure sufficient to raise water five to six feet above the
ground without the aid of a pump.13 2
The Furleys maintained their residence on a two-acre tract ad-
jacent to that of the Prathers. Furleys' residence was also supplied
with water by an artesian well which was approximately 111 feet
deep and cased with two-inch pipe. As with the Prathers' well, the
artesian pressure in Furleys' well was adequate to raise the water
level to a point above the ground.133
The third complaining family, the Zessins, owned a residential
tract near the Prathers and the Furleys. The Zessins' property,
upon which their daughter lived, was supplied with water by a 160-
foot-deep well powered by a submersible pump and cased with
four-inch pipe. 3 4
In July of 1976, the defendant Eisemann completed an irrigation
well on a ninety-acre parcel of farm property which was located in
the immediate vicinity of the plaintiffs' residences. The irrigation
well was 179 feet deep and tested at a capacity of 1,250 gallons per
minute.135
Pumping from the defendant's irrigation well began on July 9,
1976, with water being withdrawn at a rate of approximately 650
gallons per minute. The artesian wells belonging to Prathers and
Furleys ceased to function the next day and the Zessins lost the
use of their well two days later. The Zessins' submersible pump
overheated and welded itself to the casing as a result of the loss of
water, forcing them to drill a new well to a depth of 164 feet.136
A temporary injunction was issued by the Madison County Dis-
trict Court on July 20, 1976, halting the defendant's irrigation activ-
ity in order to enable a hydrologic study to be undertaken by the
130. For a discussion of artesian or confined aquifers, see supra text, at section IL
131. 200 Neb. at 2, 261 N.W.2d at 768.
132. Id., 261 N.W.2d at 767-68.
133. Id. at 2-3, 261 N.W.2d at 768.
134. Id. at 3, 261 N.W.2d at 768.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3, 261 N.W.2d at 768. Water acts as a lubricant for a submersible pump.
A lack of water over any substantial length of time will cause the pump to
reach extreme temperatures due to the friction brought about by a lack of
lubrication.
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University of Nebraska Conservation and Survey Division.137 The
study involved pumping the defendant's well at a withdrawal rate
of 375 gallons per minute for a period of three days. Following the
test pumping, the drawdown13 8 was measured on the four wells at
issue as well as several other test wells. Drawdown on the irriga-
tion well was measured at 97.92 feet, on Prathers' well at 61.91 feet,
on Furleys' well at 65.45 feet, and on Zessins' well at 65.6 feet.139
Once pumping from the irrigation well was stopped the water
levels in each of the four wells in question returned to prepumping
levels within eleven days.140
The conclusions reached by the hydrologists as a result of the
study were: (1) the irrigation well and the domestic wells were
drawing from the same aquifer; (2) the aquifer could be defined
with reasonable scientific certainty; (3) the pumping by Eisen-
mann depressed the artesian head of the domestic wells; (4) the
cone of influence' 4 ' caused by Eisenmann's pumping intercepted
or affected the plaintiff's wells; (5) the common aquifer from which
the domestic and irrigation wells draw water is sufficient to supply
both domestic and irrigation needs; and (6) for the plaintiffs to ob-
tain water from their wells during periods when Eisenmann was
pumping, they would have to pump water from the top of the
shale.142 Notwithstanding the determination that the common aq-
uifer contained quantities of water adequate to meet the reason-
ably foreseeable needs of the parties, the Conservation and Survey
Division recommended that the domestic wells be redrilled to a
depth below that of the irrigation well. This was necessary to
cause the irrigation well to run dry before the domestic wells in the
event that the aquifer did not prove sufficient. 43
The Madison County District Court found that withdrawal of
137. The injunction was ordered and testing was begun pursuant to a stipulation
by the parties. Id. at 3, 261 N.W.2d at 768.
138. See supra text accompanying note 13.
139. 200 Neb. at 3,261 N.W.2d at 768. Prior to the test pumping the level of water in
the artesian aquifer stood at some point above the level of the ground sur-
rounding the artesian wells owned by the Prathers and the Furleys. When
the water level was drawn below the level of the ground surrounding the arte-
sian wells they ceased to flow. See generally the discussion of confined aqui-
fers, supra text, at section IL
140. Id. at 34, 261 N.W.2d at 768.
141. The cone of influence is also known as the cone of depression. See supra text
accompanying note 15.
142. 200 Neb. at 4, 261 N.W.2d at 768. The shale represents the impervious layer
serving as the base of the aquifer. See generally the discussion of ground-
water aquifers, supra text, at section IM
143. Note, supra note 122, at 833 n.17 (citing an interview with Marilyn Ginsberg,
Research Hydrologist for the University of Nebraska Conservation and Sur-
vey Division, in Lincoln, Nebraska (Feb. 21, 1980)).
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
water by the defendant caused the loss of artesian pressure in the
plaintiffs' wells, thus causing interference with the plaintiffs' do-
mestic appropriation. The trial court further determined that the
aquifer contained sufficient water to suit the needs of all the par-
ties if the plaintiffs would lower their wells to the bottom of the
aquifer and the defendant would leave his well at its original
depth. The trial court then issued a permanent injunction, en-
joining the defendant from lowering his well and from pumping at
all during the period necessary for the plaintiffs to deepen their
wells. The court also awarded the plaintiffs damages in the
amount of $5,346.58, the cost of providing an assured alternative
method of water supply as determined by the court.144 The de-
fendant subsequently appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
B. The Nebraska Supreme Court Ruling
The domestic wells owned by the plaintiffs did not contribute in
any significant respect to the diminution of the available artesian
pressure or to the reduction of the water level in the aquifer.145 In
view of the fact that the plaintiffs did not lose the use of their wells
until after the defendant began pumping from his irrigation well,
the issue of liability created a question of first impression for the
court.146
It was opined by the supreme court that the trial court had ap-
plied the Restatement rule' 47 in its determination that the "defend-
ants' appropriation of water caused unreasonable harm to
plaintiffs by lowering the water table and reducing artesian pres-
sure."'4 8 Although the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
decision, it refused to apply the Restatement rule because it lacked
the breadth of the Nebraska rule. 49 The Nebraska rule, as stated
by the court, "is a combination of the American and the correlative
rights doctrine [sic] .,"50 This modified rule of reasonable use, first
announced in Olson v. City of Wahoo,151 was not applied alone in
Prather. The existing rule15 2 was further modified by the Ne-
144. 200 Neb. at 2, 261 N.W.2d at 767.
145. Id. at 7, 261 N.W.2d at 770.
146. Id.
147. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971) (adopted
as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1) (1979)). For the text of this sec-
tion, see supra note 67.
148. 200 Neb. at 8, 261 N.W.2d at 770.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 9, 261 N.W.2d at 771. For a discussion of the American rule, see supra
text, at section fI.B. The doctrine of correlative rights is discussed in the
text, at section ILC.
151. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). See supra note 49.
152. Id.
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braska groundwater preference statute,153 which gives preference
to domestic use over all other uses.'5
The Prather court pointed out that the preference statute
serves to give the plaintiffs, as domestic users, preferred status
over the defendant, whose use is agricultural.155 In language un-
necessary to the resolution of the dispute, but important in the
analysis of the decision, the court noted that as between two do-
mestic users there is neither preference nor priority.
Every overlying owner has an equal right to a fair share of the under-
ground water for domestic purposes. If the artesian head in the present
situation had been lowered by other domestic users, plaintiffs would be
entitled to no relief so long as they still could obtain water by deepening
their wells. If the water became insufficient for the use of all domestic
users, each domestic user would be entitled to a proportionate share of
the water. All domestic users, regardless of priority in time, are entitled to
a fair share of the water in the aquifer.1 5 6
In sustaining the award of damages the court applied a "but
for" type of tort analysis, stating that the plaintiffs could still ob-
tain sufficient water by deepening their wells to the shale. 5 7 Ex-
cept for the defendants' actions, however, such compensatory
measures would not have become necessary.S8
Perhaps the most significant language contained in the opinion
deals with the plaintiffs' rights to their means of access to the
groundwater. "Plaintiffs had a valuable property right in the ex-
traction of water for domestic purposes.... Plaintiffs' right to
the extraction of water from their existing wells was appropriated
or destroyed by the actions of defendants." 5 9 The whole of the
historic significance attributed to the Prather decision is embodied
in the language granting a property right in means of diversion
where a property right to only the water itself had been previously
thought to exist.
Consistent with its apparent desire to protect the plaintiffs'
means of diversion the supreme court affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing, holding that the proper measure of damages was that amount
required to return the plaintiffs to the positions they had enjoyed
prior to the intereference caused by the defendant's well. 60 'The
measure of recovery in all civil cases is compensation for the in-
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978).
154. 200 Neb. at 9, 261 N.W.2d at 771.
155. Id. at 8, 261 N.W.2d at 770.
156. Id. at 10, 261 N.W.2d at 771. No priority exists as between two users in a like
category by virtue of the fact that Nebraska does not adhere to the doctrine of
prior appropriation with regard to groundwater.
157. Id-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 11, 261 N.W.2d at 771-72 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 11, 261 N.W.2d at 772.
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jury sustained."161 Thus the judgment of $5,346.58 awarded by the
trial court was upheld as well.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
A. Property Rights in Means of Diversion
Inasmuch as the Prather decision appears to grant unlimited
protection to a preferred user's means of groundwater diversion, it
is appropriate to examine the case law in other western jurisdic-
tions1 62 as it relates to well interference disputes. In several states
a user's means of diversion has been granted much the same pro-
tection as were the plaintiffs' in Prather, although most of these
jurisdictions have since moved away from strict application of the
rule.163
In Noh v. Stoner' 64 the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that a prior
appropriator has an absolute right to his historical means and level
of diversion without regard to its reasonableness or its impact on
future use. To the extent that the prior appropriator's historical
pumping level and means of diversion were extended absolute pro-
tection, however, Noh has been overruled. 65
Where the defendant diverted the flow of river water resulting
in decreased aquifer recharge and subsequent interference with a
complainant's means of diversion, the California Supreme Court
held that a prior appropriator could not be forced to incur any ma-
terial expense in order to accommodate a junior appropriator.166
The court did, however, temper its decision somewhat by imposing
a reasonableness standard whereby the senior appropriator may
be required to make some minor changes in his means of diversion
in order to make water available for subsequent appropriators. 67
In Hanson v. Salt Lake City,168 the plaintiff lost his artesian
pressure and was forced to install a pump to withdraw water as a
result of the defendant's drilling of a new well nearby. In the re-
161. Id. at 11, 261 N.W.2d at 772 (citing Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d
684 (1960)).
162. See supra note 22 for a listing of the "western states."
163. See, e.g., Pima Farms v. Procter, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926), in which the
Arizona Supreme Court held that a senior appropriator has a right of action
against a junior appropriator for maintenance of the water table. Note, how-
ever, that since the decision in Pima Farms, Arizona has abandoned the doc-
trine of prior appropriation in favor of the rule of reasonable use. See Bristor
v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953).
164. 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
165. See Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973). For a dis-
cussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
166. Lodi v. East Bay Muni. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
167. Id. See also HuTcmNs, supra note 22, at 176-79.
168. 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949).
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sulting litigation the defendant advanced the argument that the
plaintiff had a right only to the water and not to his historic means
of access. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the argument in
holding that defendant must bear the expense of raising to the sur-
face for the prior appropriator that which had otherwise flowed
naturally under artesian pressure. The court did, however, spell
out the fact that the right to a means of diversion was not an abso-
lute right: "[S]uch means [must be] reasonably efficient and
[must not] unreasonably waste water."'6 9
The same court later ignored the reasonable diversion require-
ment of Hanson in Current Greek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews.170 In
Current Creek it was held that prior appropriators who rely on ar-
tesian pressure as their means of diversion are "entitled to have
the subsequent appropriators restrained from ... lowering the
static head pressure ... unless they replace the quantity... of
... water by pumping or other means to the prior appropriators at
the sole cost of the subsequent appropriators."' 7 ' Note, however,
that the Current Creek decision was based on a 1953 Utah stat-
ute172 requiring that any subsequent appropriator whose use
proved injurious to the quantity or quality of water available to any
prior appropriator must replace the same at the sole cost of the
subsequent appropriator. A dissenting judge in Current Creek ar-
gued vehemently that the reasoning of the majority assumed an
absolute property right in the means of diversion as well as in the
groundwater itself.17 3 The dissent contended that this logic was
contrary to the policy encouraging maximum use and development
of groundwater resources.
B. The Doctrine of Reasonable Diversion
The policy analysis of Justice Crockett's dissent in Current
Creek was ultimately utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in
adopting the doctrine of reasonable diversion in Wayman v. Mur-
ray City Corp.'7 4 In Wayman the plaintiffs complained that the
defendant, in relocating its municipal wells, had interfered with
the plaintiff's existing wells by diminishing the quantity of water
avaflable. 75 The court determined that there was not a shortage of
water, but only a decrease in pressure at the plaintiffs' well
169. Id. at 422, 205 P.2d at 263.
170. 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959).
171. Id. at 328, 344 P.2d at 531.
172. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1953).
173. 9 Utah 2d at 332, 344 P.2d at 535 (Crockett, J., dissenting).
174. 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 (1969).
175. Id. at 100, 458 P.2d at 862.
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heads.176 The court noted that, although a conflict apparently ex-
isted between the policy to maximize water usage and the Utah
statute,177 the competing interest must be balanced in a manner
best suited to serving the development of the state's water law. In
enunciating the doctrine of reasonable diversion the court ex-
plained that an application of the rule
involves an analysis of the total situation: the quantity of water available,
the average annual recharge of the basin, the existing rights and their pri-
orities. All users are required where necessary to employ reasonable and
efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to others to the end
that wastage of water is avoided and the greatest amount of available
water is put to beneficial use.17 8
The court did not define what is meant by "reasonable and effi-
cient means"' 79 of diversion, but it has elsewhere been indicated
that any attempted definition of the concept creates a great obsta-
cle for efficient groundwater management.180 Thus, the concept of
reasonable diversion or reasonable pump lift must apparently be
applied in a case-by-case analysis.
The Idaho Supreme Court has likewise strayed from the abso-
176. Id. at 101, 458 P.2d at 863.
177. The statute provides in pertinent part that "replacement shall be at the sole
cost of the applicant ... whose appropriation may diminish the [quantity] or
injuriously affect the quality of appropriated underground water." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1980). See, Comment, Protection of Means of Ground-
water Division, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635, 639 (1980).
178. 23 Utah 2d at 104, 458 P.2d at 865.
179. Id., 458 P.2d at 865.
180. What may be reasonable pump lift to an appropriator using water for irriga-
tion purposes may be unacceptable to his neighbor who is concerned only
with domestic use. These two users must, nonetheless, share water from a
common supply.
Generally, the water table (or the confining surface of an artesian aquifer)
has a slightly curved surface. Unless extraordinary structural or hydraulic
conditions are present, this surface is not subject to abrupt changes in eleva-
tion. The surface of a water table normally follows a somewhat flattened like-
ness of the overlying terrain, while the pressure surface of an artesian aquifer
often bears no resemblance to the topography above. Even though there ex-
ists a tendency toward uniform water levels in neighboring wells, there is not
always an adequate supply of water available to two wells at a common
depth. In certain cases the geologic material at the level of the water table
lacks the requisite permeability. Thus deeper drilling into rocks of appropri-
ate permeability is necessary in order to realize the desired output. Once the
drill enters these rocks, however, the water level in the well tends to rise to a
level similar to that of other wells of like depth in the area.
The amount of pump lift required is also affected by the distance from the
land surface to the groundwater level. This phenomenon gives a distinct ad-
vantage to the well owner in a valley over his neighbor on a hill. When these
factors are combined with the substantial local differences in transmissivity
which cause great variation in the drawdown resulting from the extraction of
a given quantity of water, the complexity of determining reasonable pump lift
becomes obvious. See generally CORKER, supra note 3, at 78-80.
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lute right to means of diversion granted in Noh v. Stoner181 with its
decision in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foos, Inc. 182 The Baker court held
that a prior appropriator's means of diversion will be protected
only to the extent that he has maintained reasonable pumping
levels.183 The chief concern of the Baker majority was that holders
of senior appropriative rights may occasionally be forced to "ac-
cept some modifications in their rights in order to achieve the goal
of full economic development."184
Notwithstanding any difficulty of definition, the Prather court
made no attempt whatsoever to address the reasonableness of the
plaintiffs' means of diversion. Instead, it merely created a mechan-
ical extension of property rights to include means of access. Using
a broadened version of section 858 of the Restatement (or the Ne-
braska common law rule)185 in conjunction with the preference
statute, 8 6 as the court apparently did, provides no latitude for a
denial of liability even where a preferred user is injured as an ulti-
mate result of his own inadequate means of diversion.
C. The Economic Reach Analysis
Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of rea-
sonable diversion in varying forms. In the sense that protection of
means of diversion has historically included protection of both
quantity and quality of water,187 the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that a prior appropriator does not have an absolute right to
the historical quality of his water.188 Prior to the announcement of
this rule, Colorado courts had determined the nature of reasonable
diversion from the standpoint of economic impact. In Colorado
Springs v. Bender, 89 for example, it was held that a senior appro-
priator's means of diversion must be both reasonable and efficient.
Without such a rule, the court reasoned, the owner of a shallow
well could prevent the use of water by subsequent appropriators
notwithstanding the existence of adequate quantities of water
available at greater depths.190
In keeping with the absolute property right concept, however,
the court applied the principle "that a junior appropriator may not
divert the water to which he is entitled by any ... means the re-
181. 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
182. 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
183. Id. at 585, 513 P.2d at 637. But see supra note 180.
184. 95 Idaho at 584, 513 P.2d at 636.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
186. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978).
187. See generally Comment, supra note 177.
188. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1979).
189. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
190. Id. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
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sult of which will be to diminish or interfere with the right of a
senior appropriator to full use of his appropriation."191 But the
court thought it necessary to modify this rule slightly by discuss-
ing the elevation at which the subsequent appropriator should be
required to stop pumping. The opinion suggests that the arrival at
such a determination requires the court to consider whether the
prior appropriator is utilizing a means of diversion that is "reason-
ably adequate for the use to which he had historically put the
water."' 92 In the event that the senior appropriator's means of di-
version meets this reasonbleness standard the court noted that the
subsequent appropriator should be required to bear the expense of
restoring access to the water for the senior user.1 93
The policy considerations surrounding the requirement that
the prior appropriator use a reasonable means of diversion gave
rise to the economic reach analysis. Prior to requiring the junior
user to pay the costs involved in restoring the prior appropriator's
historical means of diversion the court felt compelled to examine
the possibility of requiring the prior appropriator himself to in-
crease the efficiency of his means of diversion. In so doing the
court indicated that consideration should be given to the prior ap-
propriator's purposes for the water and his "economic reach."' 94
In expressing the concept behind the economic reach analysis the
court stated that
[t]he plaintiffs cannot reasonably command the whole source of supply
merely to facilitate the taking by them of a fraction of the entire flow to
which their senior appropriation entitles them. On the other hand, plain-
tiffs cannot be required to improve their extraction facilities beyond their
economic reach, upon a consideration of all the factors involved.195
Simply stated the concept of economic reach merely focuses on
economic efficiency as a primary means of determining the extent
to which diversion is reasonable.
Under the economic reach analysis it is evident that, while the
prior appropriator's right to his means of access is not absolute, as
in the Prather decision, it apparently remains a material right. The
ultimate determination of who will restore the prior appropriator's
means of diversion under the economic reach analysis apparently
hinges on nothing more than his financial ability to reach the water
to which he is entitled as a result of his appropriative right.
The doctrine of reasonable diversion is apparently beginning to
overshadow the economic reach analysis in Colorado. A-B Cattle
191. Id. at 463-64, 366 P.2d at 556.
192. Id. at 464, 366 P.2d at 556.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 464, 366 P.2d at 556.
195. Id.
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Co. v. United States 9 6 has raised a question as to the extent of a
senior appropriator's right to means of diversion. The A-B Cattle
Co. case flatly held that a prior appropriator does not have a right
to the historical quality of his water, at least insofar as silt content
is concerned.197 The court totally ignored any economic reach
analysis,198 and gave no indication of what future protection will be
extended to a prior appropriator's means of access in Colorado.
Perhaps the better interpretation of A-B Cattle Co. would indi-
cate that water quality has little, if any, bearing on the reasonable-
ness of a particular means of diversion. Over extended periods of
time such phenomena as pressure, quality, and quantity of water
are subject to natural change. The case may perhaps be read as
simply holding that a Colorado user is not exclusively entitled to
historic physical occurrences.
D. Combining Preferences and Priorities
The concept of preferences is generally associated with a sys-
tem of prior appropriation.199 The Nebraska statute governing ap-
propriation of surface water 200 grants priority to the user who is
first in time and also establishes preferences in accordance with
the state's constitution.20 ' The constitutional requirement that a
condemning user pay just compensation to the appropriator whose
use is condemned gives some indication of the importance of pref-
erences in relation to priorities.
It provides that an exception to that first in time, first in right doctrine will
be made to a user whose water is more highly valued by society but only if
that more highly valued use can afford to and does compensate a less val-
ued but senior use for all damages sustained. The result is to reduce ma-
terially the value of having a preferred use.2 0 2
Nebraska surface water priorities are, in another sense,
subordinate to the preferences. Practically this means that a jun-
ior preferred user may, in times of water shortage, obtain water
from a senior nonpreferred user simply by compensating the se-
nior user for the damages sustained as a result of exercising the
preference. Under the Nebraska surface water law, however, it is
not clear whether the power to exercise a preference via condem-
nation extends to individuals or is limited to institutions which
196. 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1979).
197. Id. at 543, 589 P.2d at 61.
198. Id. at 550, 589 P.2d at 67.
199. See Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 231.
200. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-204 (Supp. 1982).
201. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6. For the text of this section, see supra note 109.
202. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES COMM'N, PREFERENCES IN THE USE OF WATER 1-2
(Report No. 1, Oct. 1981) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as NEB.
NATURAL RESOURCES Com'N REPORT].
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have traditionally enjoyed the power of eminent domain. "Some
commentators have indicated that only entities having the power
of eminent domain have the right to exercise the preference
against an involuntary senior user,"2 03 while others believe that a
domestic user may exercise his preference without paying com-
pensation to the damaged nonpreferred user.204
Unlike its surface water counterpart, Nebraska groundwater
law does not provide for prior appropriation. 205 By virtue of the
fact that "[p] references generally are associated with a system of
prior appropriation.., it was surprising when the Nebraska Leg-
islature enacted the... ground water preference law"206 without
provision for prior appropriation. As a result, well interference dis-
putes must be settled under Nebraska common law207 (modified
by the preference statute as was done by the Prather court).
Commentators have speculated in the past as to whether the
preference statute grants to a preferred user some proprietary in-
terest. "If this preference scheme is viewed as vesting ground-
water rights in users preferred under the statute, this fosters the
idea that some property right, which is capable of enforcement by
judicial or administrative means, does exist in groundwater."208
The need for such speculation, however, was apparently laid to
rest by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Prather. Not only did the
decision appear to remove all doubt as to whether a preferred user
enjoys a proprietary interest in groundwater, the opinion stated
that the preferred user "has a valuable property right in the extrac-
tion of water for domestic purposes. 209 The court had therefore
extended the proprietary interest even beyond that anticipated by
pre-Prather commentators by recognizing a property right in the
preferred user's means of diversion.
But alas, the apparent clarity of the rule regarding a proprietary
interest in groundwater was only fleeting; and we were not allowed
to bask in the enlightened glow of understanding for more than a
short time. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase21o an irrigator
203. Id. at 1-5 (citing Fischer, supra note 104, at 357; Doyle, Water Rights in Ne-
braska, 29 NEB. L. REV. 385, 409 (1950); Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of
Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11, 44-49 (1965)).
204. Comment, supra note 45, at 84 (citing generally 78 AM. JuR. 2d Waters §§ 317-
28 (1975)).
205. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978). For the text of the statute, see supra note 118.
206. Harnsberger, supra note 39, at 231. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-5
(Supp. 1982) (giving a domestic user preference over appropriative rights);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 46-5-8 (Supp. 1982) (making withdrawal for rea-
sonable domestic use acceptable without obtaining a permit).
207. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
208. Comment, supra note 45, at 84.
209. 200 Neb. at 11, 261 N.W.2d at 771 (emphasis added).
210. 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
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owned adjacent tracts of land in Nebraska and Colorado with his
well situs on the Nebraska tract. The State of Nebraska sought an
injunction in the District Court of Chase County to enjoin the de-
fendant from transporting groundwater drawn from the Nebraska
well to his adjacent property in Colorado. The action was gov-
erned by a statute which provides that any person desirous of
transporting water from Nebraska to an adjoining state must first
apply to the Nebraska Department of Water Resources for a per-
mit to do so. 21 1 Such a permit may under no circumstances be
granted, however, if the state to which the water is to be trans-
ported does not grant "reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport
groundwater from that state for use in . . . Nebraska."212 The
Chase County District Court issued the injunction.2 13
The defendant appealed the decision, claiming that the statute
was not only a violation of the commerce clause, but a deprivation
of liberty and property without due process of law as well. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the appellant was deprived of
neither liberty nor property since there is no "private property
right in the water itself ... ."214
The language of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Sporhase,2 15
however, need not be construed as being inconsistent with the
court's opinion in Prather.2 16 While the Sporhase decision appar-
ently limits the notion of a proprietary interest in the water itself,
the Prather opinion clearly indicates the existence of such an in-
terest in the domestic user's means of access to groundwater.2 17
211. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
212. Id.
213. 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W. 2d at 616. In granting the injunction the district court
held that "§ 46-613.01 does not violate the commerce clause of U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, since under Nebraska law water is not an article of commerce." Id.
214. Id. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, holding that groundwater is an arti-
cle of commerce. 102 S. Ct. at 3463. The Court further held that a state's im-
position of "severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not
discrimination against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the un-
controlled transfer of water out of the State." 102 S. Ct. at 3464. The reciproc-
ity requirement of § 46-613.01, however, does nothing to "significantly advance
the State's legitimate conservation and preservation interest .... [and thus]
does not survive the 'strictest scrutiny' test reserved for facially discrimina-
tory legislation." 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
Since the United States Supreme Court did not address the issue of
whether a proprietary interest exists in groundwater, the language of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court quoted in the text apparently remains unaffected.
215. 208 Neb. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619.
216. 200 Neb. at 11, 261 N.W.2d at 771. See supra text accompanying note 209.
217. Note also the obvious factual distinctions between Prather and Sporhase.
The Sporhase case involved an irrigator, not a domestic appropriator, and the
groundwater preference statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978), supra note
118, was inapplicable since a well interference dispute was not involved.
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Thus the Nebraska rule governing well interference controversies
remains functionally unchanged.
E. Other Possibilities for the Resolution or Avoidance of Conflicts
In many of the other eighteen western states2 18 statutory at-
tempts have been made to resolve well interference disputes. In
Idaho219 and Wyoming,220 for example, a senior appropriator may,
pursuant to state law, request an administrative determination of
whether well interference is taking place. These statutes free the
potential plaintiff of the substantial economic strain involved in
meeting his burden of proof that may serve to effectively deny him
access to the courts in Nebraska.221 In several other states a junior
appropriator may be administratively regulated for the benefit of a
senior user when well interference occurs.222 Well interference
conflicts in Oregon 223 and Wyoming224 are resolved on the basis of
preferences.
Some western states utilize legislation as an attempt to avoid
well interference conflicts altogether. In a number of states well
applications are considered on the basis of what effect the pro-
posed appropriation would have on existing wells. 225 Proposed ap-
218. See supra note 22.
219. IDAHO CODE § 42-237 (1977).
220. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-911(b) (1977).
221. See, e.g., Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). Plaintiff,
who owned a gravel pit on the outskirts of the City of Wahoo, brought suit
against the city alleging that wells drilled by the defendant were causing in-
terference with his own water supply. The Nebraska Supreme Court deter-
mined that the plaintiff had failed to prove the requisite cause and effect
relationship between the defendant's wells and his own diminished water
supply. The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover damages. For recommendations concerning the burden of proof, see
infra text, at section VI.A.4.
222. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 89-2932 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(6)
(1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.775 (1980); S.D. CODnED LAws ANN. § 46-6-6.2
(Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.44.130 to .180 (1962); WYo. STAT.
§ 41-3-915 (1977).
223. OR. REV. STAT. §537.735(4)(c) (1981) (creating a system of absolute
preferences).
224. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-911(a) (1977) (creating an absolute preference for domestic
users if the domestic well is adequate). See, e.g., Bishop v. City of Casper,
420 P.2d 446 (Wyo. 1966), wherein the plaintiff sued for damages caused to his
domestic well by the defendant's wells. The Wyoming Supreme Court up-
held the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant based on
the fact that the plaintiff had failed to allege in his pleadings that his well was
adequate.
225. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (Supp. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 89-2918
(1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(7) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-12-3E (1978);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.620(3), .620(4), .622 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 46-6-7 (1967) (which contains an exception for a domestic artesian well on a
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propriations in these states which would interfere with existing
wells are either denied or granted conditionally. Certain other
states impose restrictions on groundwater use and development,
requiring the maintenance of reasonable pumping depths.22 6
Thus, senior appropriators are granted only a limited degree of
protection.2 7 In these states a preferred user may not enjoin an
inferior user unless his own well is adequate to withdraw the avail-
able groundwater supply.=2
Realizing that the Nebraska preference system may be in need
of modification, the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission has
compiled a list of fifteen alternative solutions for legislative modifi-
cation of the preference statutes.22 9 Although all of the proposed
alternatives will not be discussed, certain of them do merit
consideration.
One alternative involves a total abolition of the preferences sys-
tem.230 As it applies to groundwater, the implementation of this
rule231 would serve to make all users subject to the Nebraska com-
mon law rule.232 Each user would be entitled to make reasonable
use of the water underlying his land, and, if shortages occurred,
each user would be entitled to his reasonable proportion of the ex-
isting supply. In view of the fact that no system of prior appropria-
tion exists in Nebraska, the resolution of conflicts under this
proposal would require a case-by-case determination of the merits
involved. Conflicts between users in the same category would be
handled in the same manner as conflicts between users in different
categories.
A second alternative advocates the abolition of all preferences
except for domestic use.233 The advantage of this proposal is its
reservation of water to meet basic human needs in times of
farmstead where buildings have been located prior to drilling); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 90.44.030, .040, .090 (1962); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-932(c) (1977).
226. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(3)-(4) (1979);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1982) (which applies only to large
capacity irrigation, municipal and industrial wells); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.44.070 (1962); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
227. What is reasonable for an irrigation well may in fact not be reasonable for a
domestic well pumping from the same aquifer. See supra note 180.
228. See supra note 226.
229. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES Come'N REPORT, supra note 202, at 4-1 to 4-33.
230. Id. at 4-7 to 4-9, alternative no. 2.
231. The probable effects of each of the alternative plans presented will be dis-
cussed with respect to its implementation given no other alterations in the
existing groundwater law in Nebraska.
232. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
233. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES COMM'N REPORT, upra note 202, at 4-9 to 4-10, al-
ternative no. 3.
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shortage, a concept no doubt appealing to students of Maslow.2 4
As it relates to groundwater usage, this alternative would make
very little change in existing law since the likelihood of well inter-
ference is probably greatest in the domestic use area.
A third alternative calls for a compensation requirement to be
placed on the exercise of a groundwater preference.2 35 The imple-
mentation of this alternative proposal would naturally require the
establishment of a system or prior appropriation as well.236 With-
out the prior appropriation system any exercise of a preference
would beg for compensation, whereas with such a system only
those damaged users whose appropriation was made first would
require compensation. A substitution of this alternative for the
law applied in Prather would yield an identical result since the irri-
gator had drilled his well after the plaintiffs' wells were drilled.
Finally, the Commission proposes the imposition of reasonable
standards on the use of preferences for protecting the means of
access to a groundwater supply.237 This proposal would theoreti-
cally yield a result similar to that brought about by an application
of the doctrine of reasonable diversion.238 The imposition of a
standard of reasonable diversion would prevent the owner of a
marginally adequate domestic well from profiting at the expense of
an inferior user.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The number of new wells drilled in Nebraska in 1982 was down
considerably as compared with the irrigation boom of the past ap-
proximately ten years.239 It is anticipated that this trend will con-
234. See A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PRESONALrrY (1954).
235. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 202, at 4-30 to 4-31, al-
ternative no. 14.
236. Id. at 4-30.
237. Id. at 4-30 to 4-31, alternative no. 15.
238. See generally supra text, at section V.B.
239. Well registrations with the Nebraska Water Resources Department indicate
the following number of new wells drilled and registered in the state in each
year since 1972:
1972 .......... 2,286
1973 .......... 2,174
1974 .......... 2,820
1975 .......... 5,113
1976 .......... 5,639
1977 .......... 5,110
1978 .......... 1,815
1979 .......... 2,005
1980 .......... 2,106
1981 .......... 2,844
1982 .......... 1,211
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tinue over the next several years. 240 Whether this decline is due to
the depressed farm economy, the fear of leaner years to come, or a
combination of the two is of little consequence. The key factor is
that the number of new wells in Nebraska is declining, perhaps
signifying a trend toward relative stability in the total number of
producing wells in the state. With fewer new wells being drilled,
the probability of new well interference disputes will likely decline
proportionately.
Notwithstanding the decline in numbers of new wells drilled,
well interference conflicts will remain an unavoidable conse-
quence in a primarily agricultural society. It is with this prognosis
in mind that the observations and recommendations that follow
are made.
A. Considerations in Judicial Reform
The grant of a property right in means of diversion coupled with
a system of absolute groundwater preferences does not appear
consistent with the concepts of social and economic utility. This is
not to suggest that the result peculiar to the parties in Prather v.
Eisenmann24 1 was an inequitable one. Without being presented
with further facts it is indeed impossible to predict what effect a
consideration by the court of such standards as reasonable pump-
ing depth and foreseeability of future harm may have had on the
outcome of Prather. The suggestion that the Prather result may
not be consistent with social and economic utility merely demon-
strates a fear that inequities may be imminent in future well inter-
ference cases if similar mechanical applications of the law take
place. Nevertheless, these and other considerations must be given
due deference by the courts of Nebraska.242
These new wells raised the total number of registered wells in Nebraska from
40,419 in 1972, to 71,256 at the end of 1982. See generally Well Drilling Slows
Across Nebraska, Lincoln [Neb.] Sunday Journal & Star, Oct. 10, 1982, § B, at
1, col. 1.
240. Id.
241. 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978).
242. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 850A (1979), which suggests that
the court should consider the following.
(1) the purpose of the use; (2) the economic value of the use; (3) the
social value of the use; (4) the extent and amount of harm caused-(5) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use by one
proprietor or the other; (6) the practicality of adjusting the quantity
of water used by each proprietor; (7) the protection of existing values
of water uses, land, investments, and enterprises; and (8) the justice
of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss.
Id. at § 850A(c)-(i). Cf., Wasserberger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738(1966), modified, 180 Neb. 569, 144 N.W.2d 209 (1966), which suggests that the
following be considered: (1) the social utility associated with the respective
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1. Foreseeability of Harm
The preference statute must be considered with, rather than in
place of, the equities involved. Perhaps some interference with ar-
tesian head is to be expected if the full economic benefit of ground-
water appropriation is to be realized.
If.... appropriation is to accomplish the desired end of making full use of
ground-water resources of the state, it must be recognized that some low-
ering of the water table or the artesian pressure is a reasonable result of a
reasonable method of diversion ... and should not constitute a basis of
damages.
24 3
It is perhaps not totally inequitable to expect a domestic user to
install a pump rather than relying solely on artesian pressure as a
means of diversion. The mere loss of artesian head can often be
remedied with a submersible pump. Where, however, it is deter-
mined that the damaged well would require redrilling to a greater
depth, the domestic user has obviously been injured to a larger ex-
tent. The issue that must be considered is foreseeability of dam-
age by the domestic user.
A person building a house on a residential tract surrounded by
agricultural land should be reasonably expected to foresee the
probability of irrigation development in the area. Thus, if a domes-
tic user in an agricultural area finds his artesian head diminished
as a result of a neighboring irrigator's appropriation, the initial is-
sue to be addressed must be foreseeability of the interference.24 4
Formulating an answer to the question of what actually consti-
tutes foreseeable harm indeed presents a difficult factual dilemma.
Unfortunately, foreseeable harm is not a concept to which one can
easily attach a definition. It must, therefore, be determined by the
finder of fact in light of the circumstances peculiar to each case. Of
major importance in this vein are considerations of the age of the
plaintiff's well and the circumstances in existence at the time it
was drilled.
If, for example, the plaintiffs well had been drilled at a time
water uses; (2) the extent of harm caused by the interference; (3) the suita-
bility of the water uses relative to the water supply; and (4) the parties' re-
spective ability to prevent or avoid the harm caused by the interference.
180 Neb. at 159, 141 N.W.2d at 745-46.
243. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 19-20 n.32 (quoting Thompson & Fieder, Some
Problems Relating to Legal Control of Use of Ground Water, 30 AM. WATER
WORKS J. 1049, 1075 (1938)).
244. In a typical negligence analysis the test of foreseeable harm is one generally
applied to the actions of a defendant. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The
analysis is being applied here, however, as one of either assumption of risk,
see id. at § 68, or contributory negligence, see id. at § 65, on the part of the
plaintiff.
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prior to the advent of irrigation in his area,245 he cannot be said to
have been unreasonable in his utilization of a relatively shallow
well in comparison with today's standards. On the other hand, if
the plaintiff's domestic water needs are supplied by an artesian
well drilled at a time when irrigation was a standard agricultural
practice in his immediate area, it would have been reasonable for
him to anticipate that his neighbors may soon drill irrigation wells
on adjacent property.
2. Financial Feasibility
The financial ramifications of a complaining party's actions
must also be balanced against the subjective concept of foresee-
ability of harm. It is not economically feasible that the law should
require one to drill a well deeper than is necessary to serve its pro-
posed purpose merely as a defensive maneuver, unless the likeli-
hood of interference is relatively high. By the same token, a
domestic user should not be allowed to benefit at the expense of
others whose actions were reasonable as a result of his own inade-
quate well.
Consider the situation where an individual builds his home in a
rural area already heavily irrigated. If he drills a domestic well
during November to a minimum depth necessary to suit his needs,
he will very likely discover his means of access to be totally inade-
quate when, in the following July, the surrounding irrigators begin
to draw large quantities of water from the common resource. Yet,
under a strict application of the law as stated in Prather, the plain-
tiff would prevail in his attempt to require the interfering irrigators
to subsidize him in redrilling his domestic well to an adequate
depth.
3. The Measure of Damages
Justice demands that the preference system be modified to in-
clude the doctrine of reasonable diversion.24 6 Where a dispute
arises between a preferred user and a nonpreferred user, courts
must address the question of reasonable diversion from the stand-
point of foreseeability of harm. This determination must then
form the basis for the court's calculation of the amount of dam-
ages, if any, to be awarded.
If the plaintiff's means of access, when analyzed in light of the
245. The analysis of the facts in view of the geographical location is imperative.
Irrigation has been the standard practice in the Platte River Valley, for exam-
ple, for a much longer period than in the sandhills region of Nebraska.
246. For a discussion of the doctrine of reasonable diversion, see supra text, at
section VB.
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foregoing tests, is found to be reasonable, the defendant should be
required to pay damages in an amount necessary to restore the
plaintiff's access to a quantity of groundwater essential to meet his
needs. In the event that the plaintiffs means of diversion is found
not to have been reasonable in view of the foreseeability of the
resulting harm, he should be awarded damages only to the extent
of injuries he would have sustained had his means of diversion
been reasonable. If the court determines that no injury would
have been incurred had the plaintiff's means of diversion been rea-
sonable, no damages should be awarded.
4. The Burden of Proof
Yet another troublesome feature of the current Nebraska law
relating to well interference disputes is the burden of proof placed
upon the plaintiff by Olson v. City of Wahoo.247 In the Prather de-
cision there was no need for the court to consider the harshness of
the standard since the plaintiff's hydrologic study was undertaken
at the state's expense.248 In the event that an individual plaintiff
were forced to privately fund such a hydrologic survey, the costs
may well exceed any possible recovery.249
If the alleged interference were viewed in light of a res ipsa lo-
quitur analysis, the burden of proof would be shifted back to the
defendant to rebut the presumption that his well is the sine qua
non of the plaintiff's injury. Such an analysis appears to be logical
and equitable in the situation where the domestic well had func-
tioned adequately until the installation of an irrigation well on
nearby property. The res ipsa presumption would be strengthened
if the domestic well returned to normal production within a rea-
sonable period of time following the cessation of withdrawal from
the irrigation well.
5. Reasonableness of the Means of Diversion
Once the cause of the interference has been presumptively es-
tablished and the defendant has been unable to successfully rebut
the presumption, the court should consider more than the common
law rule as modified by the preferences. 2 50 This was in fact the
247. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). For a brief discussion of the facts involved
in this case, see supra note 221.
248. See Note, supra note 122, at 839-40 n.70.
249. For a discussion of the estimated cost of employing a private engineering firm
to conduct the hydrologic study undertaken in Prather, see id. at 841 n.75 and
accompanying text. Bear in mind that the costs indicated therein represent
early 1980 estimates.
250. "The Nebraska rule ... is a combination of the American and the correlative
rights doctrine [sic]. It must be construed, however, in light of our prefer-
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announced rule in Prather, but, as a practical matter, the court ren-
dered the concept of reasonable use totally meaningless in a fac-
tual situation to which the preference system applies. 25 ' Where a
nonpreferred user interferes with a preferred use, an application
of the rule as announced in Prather would apparently cause liabil-
ity to attach under the preference statute with no regard whatso-
ever for the reasonableness of the nonpreferred use or the
reasonableness of the preferred user's means of diversion.
The court must further consider the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's means of diversion of groundwater. As previously dis-
cussed, the plaintiff must not be unjustly enriched as a result of
interference which he should reasonably have anticipated. 252 He
must be allowed to recover damages for only that injury which he
would have sustained had his means of access been reasonable
when viewed in light of the probability of impending interference.
This factual analysis would of necessity be highly subjective, in-
cluding such factors as the age of the plaintiffs well, the extent to
which groundwater use in his locality had been developed at the
time his well was drilled, and the extent to which he could have
anticipated such development at the time of the drilling of his well.
The element of foreseeability would compel the court to apply a
negligence analysis rather than imposing upon the interfering well
owner a standard of strict liability as was done in the Prather deci-
sion. If the plaintiff's means of diversion is found to be reasonably
adequate to suit his needs when viewed in light of the foreseeabil-
ity requirement, the defendant may be found to have violated his
duty of due care. This result stems not from any willful or mali-
cious intent on the part of the defendant, but merely from the na-
ture of his activity. If the plaintiff's means of diversion is found to
be less than reasonable under the foreseeability test, the facts
should be analyzed either in terms of contributory negligence or
assumed risk. An application of the contributory negligence stan-
dard would serve to mitigate damages sustained by the plaintiff,
while an assumption of the risk standard may extinguish damages
altogether.
ence statute, section 46-613. R. R. S. 1943." 200 Neb. at 9,26 N.W.2d at 771. For
the text of the preference statute, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978), supra
note 118.
251. The evidence indicates defendants had a runoff of approximately
15 to 25 gallons of water per minute above the water utilized on their
land. The trial court found this was in excess of a reasonable and
beneficial use on their own land. It is not necessary for us to reach
this issue. We do not deem it material in view of the decision we
reach herein. This case must be analyzed in reference to ... the
preferential use statute.
200 Neb. at 7, 261 N.W.2d at 770.
252. See supra text, at section VLA.1.
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6. Social Utility
The social utility of the competing uses must also be weighed
by the court. This consideration is arguably addressed in the
groundwater preference statute,2 53 but would necessarily be ap-
plied in the resolution of disputes between two or more nonpre-
ferred users.
Such an analysis would require the court to balance the value
to society in general of each competing use in order to arrive at a
determination of which use contributes the superior benefit.
Where the parties to a dispute utilize the groundwater for the
same purpose this consideration would not apply.
Z Economic Utility
Keeping in mind the social desirability of encouraging the effi-
cient development of Nebraska's groundwater resources, courts
must balance the economic utility of the competing uses. In many
instances this consideration may be very closely related to consid-
erations of social utility, for activities that are economically benefi-
cial are often socially beneficial as well.
In its analysis of the relative economic utilities, the court must
give careful consideration to the investments involved, the impact
of a given decision on the business or other enterprises involved,
and the respective needs of each party for the water. In the case of
a high capacity industrial or irrigation well, the capital outlay nec-
essary to restore access to a damaged user may be beyond the
financial means of the party against whom a judgment is rendered.
An application of strict liability standards for interference with a
preferred user may also have a negative impact on the value of
agricultural or industrial real estate. The developer of such prop-
erty would have no way of anticipating that his well or wells may
one day interfere with a neighboring domestic well that has not yet
been drilled. The court must also compare the quantity of water
needed by each user and the necessity for the water as it relates to
the continued productivity of each enterprise.
8. Extent of the Harm
The extent of harm caused by the defendant is another issue
which must be addressed by the court. It is imperative that the
factual questions of the existence and the extent of the defend-
253. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978); supra note 118. Social utility was arguably
addressed by the drafters of the statute in view of the very nature of the pref-
erence system. The system assigns a greater social value to domestic use
than to any other form of use, and a greater social value to agricultural use
than to industrial use.
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ant's causation of the injury sustained by the plaintiff be ex-
amined. In certain circumstances it is entirely possible that wells
other than the defendant's have contributed to the plaintiff's loss.
In such a case it is logical that the other interfering parties be
joined and, where liability is found, forced to contribute in an effort
to further the policy in favor of loss spreading.
9. Capacity to Bear the Loss
Yet another point to be analyzed by the court is the justice of
requiring the party causing the interference to bear the entire loss.
Again a standard tort analysis may be applied in an effort to deter-
mine the capacity of each party to stand the loss which must nec-
essarily fall on one or the other. Such a balancing test is not based
so much on the respective wealth of the parties as it is on each
party's ability to absorb the loss or avoid it entirely.
An analysis of this nature would be particularly applicable
where the controversy pits an individual user against a large in-
dustrial user, a public utility, a large corporate agricultural user, or
a municipality. Such a large scale appropriator is normally in a
much better position to absorb the loss through the use of taxes,
pricing practices, or rates2M than is the individual user.
In the event of multiple party causation, a system of pro rata
contribution may prove to be equitable. Problems may arise, how-
ever, in that extensive hydrological testing would be required in
order to effectively determine each defendant's proportionate
share of liability.
10. Limits on the Quantity of Water Used
Finally, the court should consider the practicality of adjusting
the quantity of water being used by either party to the action.
Such an adjustment of the quantity used will necessarily be ap-
plied where waste is taking place by one or more of the competing
users or where groundwater mining is in progress causing aquifer
insufficiency. A reduction in consumption by one or more parties
may indeed prove to be more equitable than redrilling one or more
wells.
In the final analysis the court must consider all of the factors
previously addressed, balancing each in accordance with the par-
ticular facts of the case. Certain of the considerations mentioned
will be inapplicable in some controversies, but those that apply
must be given careful evaluation by the court. Through a process
of utilizing the applicable considerations discussed here, the court
will be much better able to arrive at a decision which represents a
254. See generally PRossER, supra note 244, at § 4.
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delicate balance of the facts against standards of equity and fair-
ness rather than a strict application of anachronistic rules.
B. Considerations in Legislative Reform
While fair and equitable resolution of disputes is indeed a wor-
thy goal, those individuals seeking judicial redress for damages
sustained as a result of well interference are too late to avoid at
least some harm or inconvenience. Regardless of how well the
court system balances the equities involved, one of the parties may
come away with his desired result and the other with ill will to-
ward the legal system, for unfortunately, only one party may
prevail.
Perhaps a goal even more noble than the just resolution of well
interference disputes is the complete avoidance of such controver-
sies to as great an extent as is possible. This goal can be ap-
proached only through wise and well planned legislation. With
this end in mind, the guidelines that follow may act as a step to-
ward avoidance of future well interference conflicts through sound
legislative action.
1. The Effects of a Proposed Well
Legislation which provides for an administrative determination
of the effect a proposed new well would have on existing area wells
prior to the issuance of a well permit would serve to reveal poten-
tial conflicts before they develop.255 Under such legislation an ad-
ministrative agency, such as the Nebraska Water Resources
Department, would be responsible for reviewing each well applica-
tion in light of the existing number of wells in the immediate area
of the proposed well, the respective capacities of existing wells, the
existence of prior well interference conflicts (if any) in the area,
the type of usage to which water withdrawn from existing wells is
put, and the purpose for which water extracted from the proposed
well will be utilized. These suggested administrative considera-
tions are certainly not intended to comprise an exhaustive list of
determinative factors; other considerations which the legislature
or the agency in charge believes to be pertinent should be in-
cluded. In the event that a proposed well is determined, through
the administrative process, to present a threat to existing area
wells, the permit could be refused or granted conditionally with an
express limitation as to permissible quantities of water that may
be withdrawn.
Another alternative available to those granting a conditional
255. For citations to representative statutes drafted on a similar concept and en-
acted in other jurisdictions, see supra note 225.
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permit is the approval of an unconditional permit containing an
express reservation mandating that the withdrawals from the new
well will be decreased in the event of interference. In an effort to
defray the necessary administrative costs incurred pursuant to
such an investigation, it would become necessary to increase the
fee required to accompany the well application.
2. Public Hearings
A second legislative alternative would provide for the establish-
ment of a system under which public hearings would be held in
locations easily accessible to the local populace prior to the ap-
proval of new well applications. The agency conducting these
hearings should be the same agency that reviews the well applica-
tion and makes the determinations regarding potential interfer-
ence. The hearings should occur after the responsible agency has
reached a decision regarding potential conflicts.
At such hearings citizens who oppose the application would be
permitted the opportunity to air their concerns before an official
(or a panel of such officials) representing the controlling adminis-
trative agency. The hearings would be conducted in a manner sim-
ilar to that utilized by a zoning board. Following a hearing, the
agency would review the testimony heard and weigh opponents'
views in the determination of whether, and to what extent, i.e.,
conditional or unconditional, the requested permit should be
granted.
3. Standing to Sue
Finally, in an effort to statutorily recognize the doctrine of rea-
sonable diversion,256 the Nebraska Unicameral should carefully
consider imposing a requirement that no preferred user will have
standing to enjoin or seek damages from any other user for well
interference unless the complaining party's well is drilled to a rea-
sonable depth and his means of diversion is also reasonable.257 As
previously discussed,258 this concept would prevent the com-
plaining user from obtaining a windfall at the expense of another
user in the event that a conflict were to arise. The appropriate ad-
ministrative agency would issue a declaratory ruling,259 creating a
rebuttable presumption that pumping depth and means of diver-
sion are or are not reasonable. The presumption would operate in
256. For a discussion of the doctrine of reasonable diversion, see supra text, at
section V.B.
257. For citations to representative statutes drafted on concepts similar to the
idea set out here and enacted in other jurisdictions, see -upra note 226.
258. See supra text, at section VLA.2.
259. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-912 (1981).
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much the same fashion as the res ipsa loquitur presumption of the
cause of the interference.260
In arriving at a determination of whether the means of diver-
sion and the pumping depth in the complainant's well are reason-
able, the investigating agency should consider the utility of the
proposed water use, the terrain of the surrounding area, and the
depth of similar wells in the same vicinity. Again, the list of con-
siderations is not exhaustive and the legislature, by statute, must
give to the investigating agency the authority necessary to con-
sider other pertinent factors in arriving at the administrative de-
termination of reasonableness or unreasonableness. Where the
parties contest the validity of the declaratory ruling issued by the
agency, an opportunity for a hearing on the contested issues is
provided.61
If, at the conclusion of these administrative proceedings, the
parties involved are dissatisfied with the result, provisions cur-
rently exist whereby the decision may be appealed.26 2 Under such
a provision a party would be given the opportunity to appeal the
administrative determination to the district court.263 The district
court finding, if unsatisfactory to either litigant, may be subse-
quently appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.264
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of technological advancements made in our agrarian
society and the exigency for full groundwater resource develop-
ment, well interference controversies are to be expected. So long
as wells continue to draw water from common sources interfer-
ence will exist to some degree. It is the avoidance of these dis-
putes that must be of paramount concern to the Nebraska
Unicameral, and the fair and equitable resolution of such conflicts
that must be the polar star by which the courts guide their
decisions.
When the legislative channels for dispute avoidance do not
prove sufficient and well interference cases come before the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, it must not decide the controversies with
its visual acuity hampered by the restrictive blinders of stare deci-
sis. By considering the recommendations previously noted the
court can be free to expand the common law rules to include a bal-
260. The res ipsa loquitur presumption of the cause of interference is discussed in
the text, at section VIA.4.
261. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-913 to -915 (1981).
262. See infra notes 263-64.
263. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (1981).
264. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-918 (1981).
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ancing of the interests involved in each case, thereby reaching eq-
uitable and just conclusions.
The Nebraska groundwater preference statute265 has remained
unaltered since its inception. It simply states that one type of use
is superior to another without requiring reasonableness in one's
means of access. Should the statute continue to stand with such
broad parameters, it is conceivable that the court could judicially
modify its construction to include the doctrine of reasonable diver-
sion. To do so would entail nothing more than a modification of the
Nebraska common law doctrine of reasonable use266 which the
court purported to apply in conjunction with the preference stat-
ute in Prather. By modifying the common law rule to include the
doctrine of reasonable diversion, the court could consider the dis-
pute from the standpoint of fairness, a consideration which has
been sadly absent in prior adjudications of well interference con-
flicts in Nebraska.
A number of considerations have been suggested in this Com-
ment that, when applied by Nebraska courts, may serve to remedy
the inequities brought about by the Prather decision. Sound legal
reasoning compels the conclusion that, in an effort to maximize the
probabilities for fair and just resolutions in future well interfer-
ence controversies, the courts must analyze the facts in light of the
considerations set out herein.
Judicial reform, however, will not be sufficient to alleviate this
enigma in its entirety. A mitigation of the existing inequities must
be coerced through immediate legislative action. If indeed the leg-
islature were to rectify the problem before more well interference
controversies are presented to the supreme court, the court would
be relieved of any necessity to wrestle with the dilemma involved
in overturning precedent.
Stephen S. Gealy '83
265. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978); supra note 118.
266. See supra note 49.
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